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NOTE
SPECIAL PROTECTION IN THE AIR[LINE
INDUSTRY]: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
SECTION 1110 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Gregory P. Ripple*
INTRODUCTION
The airline industry is not for the faint of heart. The deregula-
tion of the airline industry in 19781 coincided with the adoption of
the Federal Bankruptcy Code.2 In the six years following deregula-
tion, over 130 new commercial air carriers took off into the newly
opened American skies.3 While there were success stories, there were
many failures, and American airlines have not been strangers to the
American bankruptcy courts.
The great capital expense required of airlines to build and main-
tain their fleet makes them particularly susceptible to economic down-
turns. Today's modern jetliners cost at a very minimum tens of
millions of dollars apiece. 4 Airlines, even well-established ones, simply
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2003; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 1994; M.A., Fordham University, 1996; M. Phil., Fordham University,
2000.
1 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
2 Pub. L. No. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2629 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000)).
3 Michael A. Katz, The American Experience Under the Deregulation Act of 1978-An
Airline Perspective, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 87, 93 (1988); Mark C. Mathiesen, Bank-
ruptcy of Airlines: Causes, Complaints, and Changes, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 1017, 1022
(1996).
4 The cost of a brand new Boeing jetliner, for instance, ranges from approxi-
mately $35 million for the Boeing 717-200 to in excess of $230 million for the Boeing
777-300ER. See Boeing Commercial Airplane Prices, at http://www.boeing.com/com-
mercial/prices (last visited Oct. 14, 2002).
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cannot afford to own all their aircraft outright.5 In order to secure
the needed aircraft to fly, airlines engage in rather complicated fi-
nancing arrangements not only with financial institutions, but also
with the aircraft manufacturers themselves.6
Given the large amount of money involved and airline susceptibil-
ity to bankruptcy, financiers have long demanded special protection
for their investment. Without this protection, financial institutions or
aircraft manufacturers would be unwilling to provide financing for air-
craft to new or troubled airlines, or would do so only under terms far
less favorable to the borrower.7 As a result of this pressure, Congress
included provisions under the old Bankruptcy Act that "effectively sus-
pended the rules of bankruptcy that inhibited the rights of aircraft
financers to remove aircraft from an airline's bankruptcy estate."8
The Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978, contains a similar provi-
sion.9 The automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code typically prevents a
The difficulty these costs impose on start-up airlines is evidenced in the circum-
stances surrounding the beginnings ofJetBlue Airways. In 1999 the airline launched
with $130 million in capital investment, the largest capital buildup in the history of
the American airline industry. This amount would have been sufficient to buy out-
right only one of the airline's twenty-three Airbus A320s. See Fact Sheet-Jet Blue, at
www.jetblue.com/learnmore/factsheet.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2002).
5 SeeJason J. Kilborn, Thou Canst Not Fly with Borrowed Wings: Airline Finance and
Bankruptcy Code Section 1110, 8 GEo. MASON L. Rrv. 41, 41-42 (1999).
6 American Trans Air (ATA), for instance, recently began to take possession of
new Boeing 737s to replace its aging fleet of Boeing 727s. As part of the purchase
agreement, Boeing agreed not only to accept the older 727s as "trade-ins," but also
agreed to purchase a large number of shares in the airline. See David C. Forward,
ATA: Whither Goest Thou?, AIRWAYS, Dec. 2001, at 39, 44.
In addition to the purchase of new aircraft, airlines often use their ownership of
aircraft as a source of new capital. Before the 1960s, it was common for an airline to
borrow money against the security of the aircraft, similar to a homeowner taking out a
"home improvement" loan. This type of financing is no longer common, because of
negative tax implications. A more common practice is the "sale-leaseback" arrange-
ment, whereby an airline sells its equipment and then leases the same equipment
back from the purchaser. Sale-leasebacks are advantageous to both sides by allowing
the airline to raise capital from its existing assets while also allowing the purchaser-
lessor to take advantage of the tax benefits of ownership. Sandor E. Schick, When
Airlines Crash: Section 1110 Revisited, 48 Bus. LAW. 277, 283-84 (1992).
7 See James W. Giddens & Sandor E. Schick, Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code:
Time for Refueling?, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 109 (1990) ("Aircraft equipment financiers
who deal with the smaller or less financially resilient airlines regard [special protec-
tion for their investments] as the sine qua non of the financing; creditors of more
financially stable carriers reportedly in some instances will do without protection, but
only on less favorable terms to the borrower."); see also Kilborn, supra note 5, at 42.
8 Kilborn, supra note 5, at 42.
9 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000).
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secured party or lessor from asserting their rights to repossess collat-
eral.10 Title 11, Section 1110 of the U.S. Code, however, provides an
exception to the automatic stay, and allows the financiers of aircraft
and aircraft parts to repossess their collateral if the airline is unable to
cure any defaults within thirty days."' Section 1110 has played a prom-
inent role in many airline bankruptcies over the last now almost
twenty-five years, 12 and has been revised several times in response to
questions raised in its application. This note addresses the historical
development of § 1110. Part I briefly explains the separate waves of
airline bankruptcies that the industry has experienced in the era of
deregulation. Part II discusses the 19th century origins of this special
protection and the enactment of § 1110 in the Bankruptcy Code. Part
III introduces the first major amendments to § 1110, contained in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. Part IV considers the case of Western
Pacific Airlines and its aftermath, which resulted in the 2000 amend-
ments to § 1110.
I. AIRLINE BANKRUPTCY IN THE ERA OF DEREGULATION
A. The Early Years: Wave One
In the first six years of the deregulated era, beginning in 1978,
over 130 new airlines took to the skies. 13 Inevitably, many of these
endeavors crashed just as quickly as they had taken off. The economic
recession of the early 1980s coupled with high fuel costs made it diffi-
cult for new airlines to compete with their larger, more established
competitors.' 4 By 1988, over 100 of these new carriers had disap-
peared. 15 In addition, some established pre-regulation carriers found
it difficult to adapt to the new deregulated market conditions. Large
regional carriers such as Air Florida and Frontier Airlines who could
not expand their routes to compete with national airlines filed Chap-
ter 11 petitions in the early 1980s. 16 Continental Airlines and Braniff
10 Id. § 362.
11 Id.§1110.
12 See, e.g., In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Pan Am
Corp., 929 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Air Vermont, Inc., 761 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1985); In re Braniff, Inc., 110 B.R. 980 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
13 Katz, supra note 3, at 93.
14 Athanassios Papaioannou, The Duty To Bargain and Rejection of Collective Agree-
nlents Under Section 1113 by a Bankrupt Airline: Trying To Reconcile R.L.A. with Bankruptcy
Code, 18 TRANsp. L.J. 219, 220 (1990).
15 Katz, supra note 3, at 94.
16 Papaioannou, supra note 14, at 220.
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represented major American international carriers in the bankruptcy
courts during this same period.17
B. The Early 1990s: Wave Two
The economic downturn of the early 1990s saw a second wave of
post-deregulation airline bankruptcies.' 8 The economic recession
combined with rising oil prices during and after the Gulf War resulted
in an almost universal decline in profit margin for American carri-
ers. 19 Indeed, operating profit margin for the industry fell to negative
three percent in 1992, down from its high in excess of five percent in
the late 1980s.20 Furthermore, many airlines had expanded during
the boom years of the late 1980s through mergers and acquisitions
financed by a great deal of highly leveraged debt.2 1 Debt loads which
could barely be managed in good economic times became overwhelm-
ing in the economic climate of the early 1990s. 22 Finally, the bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, had a further impact
on the demand for air travel. 23 Estimates of the total extent of the
airline industries' losses in those years range from $10.6 to $12.8
billion.
24
I The airlines that filed for Chapter 11 protection in this period
were not new upstart airlines or established, but regionalized, carriers,
as in the prior wave. This second wave saw well-established airlines
succumb to mounting losses. 25 Eastern and Pan Am, both among the
17 Id. Continental's 1983 bankruptcy was unique in the industry in that the
Chapter 11 filing was not motivated by poor profit performance, but by manage-
ment's desire to lower labor costs. Continental's 12,000 employees were heavily un-
ionized. Id. Although otherwise healthy, Continental's reorganization was designed
to void and renegotiate the collective bargaining agreements between the airline and
the unions that represented Continental's employees. See STEVEN A. MORRISON &
CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF TH-E AIRLINE INDUSTRY 108 (1995).
18 Mathiesen, supra note 3, at 1023.
19 M. at 1023-24; see also MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 17, at 30.
20 MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 17, at 31. Operating profit margin is the
percentage by which revenue exceeds costs. Operating profit margin does not take
into account interest on long-term debt and income taxes. Id.
21 Mathiesen, supra note 3, at 1023.
22 Id. at 1024.
23 Id. at 1023-24.
24 MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 17, at 30 n.24.
25 Several upstart airlines joined the well-established carriers in Chapter 11. Both
Midway Airlines and America West filed for Chapter 11. Id. America West success-
fully reorganized, while Midway was liquidated. Id. See also Mathiesen, supra note 3,
at 1018 n.6.
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nation's oldest airlines, were liquidated. 26 Colorful Braniff Airlines
ceased operations after a second bankruptCy. 27 Likewise, Continental
Airlines filed its second Chapter 11 petition in a four-year span.
28
Trans World Airlines (TWA) as well turned to the bankruptcy courts
when it became unable to handle the weight of the debt acquired in
its acquisition by Carl Icahn.29
C. The Twenty-First Century: Phase 3?
The economic downturn of the early twenty-first century appears
to have sparked a third wave of airline bankruptcies. Even before the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and New York
City, National and Midway Airlines were operating under the protec-
tion of the bankruptcy court.30 As business and leisure travel plum-
meted after September 11, American airlines began to encounter
severe financial losses.31 Sun Country Airlines became the first victim
of the economic turmoil when it filed for bankruptcy in January,
2002.32 In late summer 2002, upstart Vanguard Airlines and major
player US Airways filed for Chapter 11 within weeks of each other.
33
By the end of the summer of 2002, United Airlines was seeking major
concessions from its unions and had retained bankruptcy counsel.3
4
Although United's leadership claims that bankruptcy is not inevitable,
26 Mathiesen, supra note 3, at 1024; see also MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 17,
at 30.
27 Mathiesen, supra note 3, at 1018 n.7.
28 Id.; see also infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
29 Mathiesen, supra note 3, at 1023.
30 See Midway Files for Bankruptcy, Lays Off 700, Cuts Fleet, AVIATION DAILY, Aug. 15,
2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 8898692; National's Debts Nears $120 Million As It Files
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 8, 2000, at 3, available at 2000 WL
9307591.
31 See U.S. Major Carriers Financial Results, Third Quarter 2001, AVIATION DAILY,
Mar. 11, 2001, at 7, available at 2002 WL 7637019.
32 See Sun Country Lessors Move Bankruptcy Petition, AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 28, 2002,
at 4, available at 2002 WL 7636191. Sun Country was the first American casualty after
the September 11 attacks. In Europe, the sudden disruption of air travel struck more
swiftly. By the end of 2001, Belgian flag carrier Sabena and Swissair had ceased flying.
See Swissair, Flightlease Get Creditor Protection, AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 5, 2001, at 2, availa-
ble at 2001 WL 8900826; Sabena Files for Bankruptcy, AVIATION DAILY, Nov. 7, 2001, at 1,
available at 2001 WL 8900288.
33 See Vanguard Ceases Operations After ATSB Rejects Second Application, AVIATION
DAILY, July 31, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 7639891.
34 UAL Warns of Bankruptcy, Sets 30-Day Countdown for Concession, AVIATION DAILY,
Aug. 25, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 7640185.
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many media pundits believe the airline too will seek to reorganize
under the protection of the bankruptcy courts.
35
Section 1110 may potentially play a major role in the current, and
in any future, Chapter 11 proceedings of major American carriers. As
discussed above, even major carriers cannot afford to own their entire
fleet outright. 6 At the time of its bankruptcy petition, US Airways
leased 203 of the 306 aircraft in its fleet.3 7 Section 1110 forces an
airline in Chapter 11 to make final, binding decisions concerning bil-
lions of dollars worth of equipment very early in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. An understanding of the pre-Bankruptcy Code origins of
§ 1110 and its subsequent evolution is essential to understanding the
interests behind this accelerated decision requirement.
III. PRE-CODE AIRCRAFT FINANCIER PROTECTION & THE ENACTMENT
OF § 1110
The historical origins of § 1110 date back to the nineteenth cen-
tury railroad industry. Railroads share two important characteristics
with airlines. First, the equipment needed to operate is very expen-
sive, and usually must be financed. 38 Second, railroads were no stran-
ger to bankruptcy. 39 Nineteenth century railroads developed a
unique two-tiered style of financing.40 Rolling stock was financed sep-
arately from the railroad's other assets, primarily real property and
structures, through a mortgage agreement. Financiers of the rolling
stock, therefore, enjoyed a priority on their separate liens on the
equipment.
41
35 See Bankruptcy Not a Given., United Says, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 5, 2002,
at 2, available at 2002 WL 24313499; Susan Carey & Joann S. Lublin, New UAL Chief
Faces Struggle To Cut Costs, Keep Airline Aloft, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2002, at Al; Dave
Carpenter, United's Chief Executive Says Bankruptcy Filing Not Certain, FT. WORTH STAR
TELEGRAM, Sept. 5, 2002, at 2, available at 2002 WL 24696558.
36 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
37 Chapter I l Forces US Airways To Evaluate Leasing Options, AVIATION DAILY, Aug.
13, 2002, at 3, available at 2002 WL 7640139. US Airways leases covered almost every
type of aircraft in their fleet. At the time of filing, the airline leased 3 Boeing 727s,
109 Boeing 737s, II Boeing 757s, 4 Boeing 767s, 44 Airbus A319s, 13 Airbus A320s, 8
Airbus A321s, 4 Fokker 100s, 1 McDonald-Douglas MD-81, and 6 McDonald-Douglas
MD-82s. Id.
38 Glenn S. Gerstell & Kathryn Hoff-Patrinos, Aviation Financing Problems Under
Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, 61 Am. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1987).
39 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 430 (1965) ("His-
torically the railroads have made insolvency a way of life, with brief periods of prosper-
ity punctuating the successive reorganizations.").
40 See 2 id. at 753.
41 Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 38, at 5.
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This system served the railroad industry well for over half a cen-
tury. In 1935, however, the Supreme Court interfered. On July 7,
1933, the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railway filed a reorganiza-
tion petition under the Bankruptcy Act.42 On September 26, the rail-
road filed papers in the district court indicating that the railroad
could no longer meet interest payments owed on certain mortgage
bonds secured by liens on its rolling stock.43 Each of the notes con-
tained a provision that the note would become due on the nonpay-
ment of interest or if the railway became insolvent or entered
receivership. 44 The notes further provided that the holders of the
bonds could have the collateral sold to satisfy the debt in the case of
default. 45 The railway petitioned the court to enjoin the holders of
the notes from selling any of the collateral, arguing that the debt was
oversecured and the property was necessary for reorganization.46 The
district court granted the injunction over the creditors' objections,
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
4 7
The Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy court had the au-
thority to enjoin the sale of the collateral if the sale would hinder,
delay, or obstruct a plan of reorganization. 48 The Court reasoned that
bankruptcy proceedings are proceedings in equity, and equity courts
have a broad array of tools at their disposal: "[t]he power to issue an
injunction when necessary to prevent the defeat or impairment of its
jurisdiction is, therefore, inherent in a court of bankruptcy, as it is in a
duly established court of equity." 49 The district court, therefore, acted
within its discretion and power to issue an injunction preventing ac-
tions that would undermine the purpose of the bankruptcy statute. 50
The power of the district court-recognized by the Supreme Court in
42 Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Chicago, Rock Island, & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 656-57
(1935). Nine of the railroad's subsidiaries subsequently filed bankruptcy petitions.
See id.
43 Id. at 657.
44 Id. at 659-60.
45 Id. at 660.
46 Id. at 657.
47 See In re Chicago, Rock Island, & Pac. Ry., 72 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1934). The
district court reasoned that a sale of the collateral would be inconsistent with the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, "and would hinder, impede, obstruct, delay,
and ... prevent the orderly preparation and consummation of a plan of reorganiza-
tion." Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank, 294 U.S. at 666.
48 Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank, 294 U.S. at 675-78.
49 Id. at 675.
50 Id. at 676.
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Continental Illinois National Bank5 1-to suspend effectively the rights of
secured creditors frightened equipment financiers. A successful rail-
road reorganization could take years to effectuate. During that time,
although the railroad could still be in default, lenders would be effec-
tively stripped of the power to foreclose and sell the collateral. Finan-
ciers, therefore, turned to Congress to reinstate their rights. Congress
responded by adding section 77(j) to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.52
Section 77(j) allowed the owner of conditionally sold or leased rolling
stock equipment to take possession of the collateral despite the com-
mencement of a reorganization case. 53 This was neither an insignifi-
cant nor minor piece of legislation. When section 77(j) was added to
the Bankruptcy Act, fifty-five railroads were engaged in bankruptcy or
receivership proceedings. 54 In 1957, the same protections were added
to the Bankruptcy Act for owners of aircraft equipment in section
116(5), 55 and for those of watercraft in 1968. 56
In 1975, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania managed to frustrate the right of a secured creditor to repos-
sess the rolling stock of a railroad in default in spite of section 77(j). 57
The Penn Central Railroad had borrowed from Citibank to purchase
rolling stock. 58 In 1975, Penn Central no longer had the financial
resources to make the principal and interest payments on these
loans.59 The federal government, through a special agency created by
Congress, the United States Railway Association (USRA), proposed a
51 The Supreme Court made it clear that the power of the district court to issue
the injunction does not modify or eliminate the rights of the creditors: "it does no
more than suspend the enforcement of the lien .... " Id.
52 See Act of Aug. 27, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-381, ch. 774, 49 Stat. 922 (repealed
1978). The new section 77(j) provided:
The title of any owner, whether as trustee or otherwise, to rolling-stock
equipment leased or conditionally sold to the debtor, and any right of such
owner to take possession of such property in compliance with the provisions
of any such lease or conditional sale contract, shall not be affected by the
provisions of this section.
Id.
53 Id.
54 Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 38, at 6.
55 Act of Sept. 4, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-295, 71 Stat. 617 (repealed 1978). Con-
gress apparently was concerned that many smaller airlines could not generate suffi-
cient capital to replace aging aircraft. See H.R. REP. No. 85-944, at 1 (1957), reprinted
in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1926, 1926. The hope was the amendment "would result in an
increased availability of capital . . . at a lower interest rate." Id.
56 Act of Oct. 17, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-586, 82 Stat. 1149 (repealed 1978).
57 In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 402 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Penn. 1975).
58 Giddens & Schick, supra note 7, at 117.
59 See id.
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plan designed to keep Penn Central's rolling stock riding the rails.
The USRA would make the railroad's installment payments as they
became due.6 0 This payment would not extinguish the debt, but Ci-
tibank would assign to the USRA its rights to recover that installment
from Penn Central. 61 In approving the plan, the district court rea-
soned, "[section] 77(j) of the Bankruptcy Act does not preclude a
reorganization court from decreeing that, so long as the holders of
equipment obligations receive in cash a particular installment when
due, they may not declare a default and attempt to accelerate the bal-
ance or repossess the equipment. '" 6 2 In addition to approving the
plan the court also enjoined the creditor from declaring the loan in
default so long as they received the cash the conditional sales agree-
ment laid out, whether the payee be the railroad or the USRA.
63
The district court's decision in Penn Central can be easily de-
fended on equitable grounds. No party was injured. The railroad
continued to operate and its debt obligations remained the same. Ci-
tibank received the payment it was due. The USRA made Penn Cen-
tral's payments and in return received a subordinate interest in the
collateral. Perhaps the only real losers in the equation were the Amer-
ican taxpayers who effectively subsidized the failing railroad, but, of
course, they received the benefits of an operating rail system. From its
inception, however, section 77(j) was added to the Bankruptcy Act to
limit the power of a bankruptcy court to exercise its equitable powers.
After all, the language of the statute states that the rights of the se-
cured creditor of rolling stock "shall not be affected" by proceedings
in bankruptcy. 64 If this legislative history and purpose did not bother
the Penn Central court, what would prevent other courts from again
exercising their equitable powers to interfere with the rights of se-
cured equipment financiers?
In 1978, Congress adopted the new federal Bankruptcy Code.
Worried by the Penn Central decision, transportation financiers lob-
bied Congress heavily to include even stronger protection for their
interests in both railroad rolling stock and aircraft. 65 Although some
members of Congress questioned the necessity of special protection
for transportation financiers, 66 Congress obliged by including § 1110
60 Penn Cent., 402 F. Supp. at 133-34.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 138.
63 Id. at 138-39.
64 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
65 Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 38, at 7 n.26.
66 The report of the House of Representatives concerning the proposed § 1110
stated, "Whether or not there was an initial need for these provisions, their existence
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in the Bankruptcy Code, which generally preserved aircraft financiers'
rights to repossess under the Bankruptcy Act. 6
7
Section 1110 requires an airline that has filed a Chapter 11 peti-
tion and has defaulted on its debt obligations on its aircraft to make
an important early decision. Within sixty days of the filing of the peti-
tion, the airline must decide whether it wishes to assume the obliga-
tions of the lease or purchase agreement and retain possession of the
aircraft.68 If the airline chooses to retain the aircraft, it must not only
cure all defaults within the sixty-day period, but the airline must also
agree to perform all its future obligations according to the terms of
the lease or sales agreement. 69 If the airline chooses not to retain the
aircraft, the automatic stay of § 362 does not apply and the financier
can immediately assert its rights under the lease or purchase agree-
ment to take possession of the collateral. 7°
The legislative history of § 1110 is sparse. 71 The House and Sen-
ate reports on this section of the new Bankruptcy Code are very
brief.72 Apparently, Congress designed § 1110 to preserve the existing
protections of section 166(5) of the Bankruptcy Act.73 Most commen-
tators agree that Congress hoped to strengthen the borrowing power
of airlines engaged in fleet modernization by offering equipment fin-
anciers more security on their investment by limiting the equitable
powers of the bankruptcy court to modify their rights to take posses-
sion of collateral after a default.74
has become largely addicting to the financing industry, and now the industry claims it
would simply cease financing of the relevant equipment if the protections were re-
moved." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 239 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6198-200. For a brief discussion of the congressional debate, see Gerstell & Hoff-
Patrinos, supra note 38, at 7-8.
67 See Appendix A of this Note for the full text of the original version of § 1110.
Congress also included an almost identical section protecting the financiers of rail-
road rolling stock. See 11 U.S.C. § 1168 (2000).
68 Id. § 1110(a) (2) (B).
69 Id. Pre-petition defaults must be cured by the end of the sixty-day period.
Post-petition defaults must be cured within thirty days or within in the sixty-day grace
period, whichever is later. Id.
70 Id.
71 Giddens & Schick, supra note 7, at 126.
72 Id. at 127.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 126-27; Anthony Michael Sabino, Flying the Unfriendly Skies: A Year of Reor-
ganizing Airlines, Aircraft Lessors and the Bankruptcy Code, 57J. AIR L. & COM. 841, 851
(1991).
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II. THE 1994 AMENDMENTS TO § 1110
By 1994, the American airline industry experienced the first two
waves of post-deregulation bankruptcies. 75 These cases exposed ambi-
guities in § 1110, and bankruptcy courts were forced to decide the
issues with little guidance from either the statute or congressional in-
tent and no applicable case law. This uncertainty threatened to defeat
§ 1110's legislative purpose of providing assurances to secured credi-
tors that they would absolutely retain their right to repossess the col-
lateral in case of default or bankruptcy. Congress amended the
section in 1994 in response to the issues raised in this litigation. 76 The
1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code affected § 1110 in three
ways. First, the 1994 amendments expanded the definition of covered
carriers. 7 7 Second, the changes clarified whether all leases and secur-
ity interests in equipment were covered by § 1110.78 Finally, Congress
dealt with the interplay between § 1110 and the "cramdown" provi-
sions of § 1129. 79
A. Expansion of Covered Carriers
The original § 1110 required the debtor to be "an air carrier op-
erating under a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the
Civil Aeronautics Board [(CAB)] .'80 During Pan Am's reorganiza-
tion, this limitation denied certain creditors the protection of § 1110.
Pan Am Express, a wholly owned subsidiary of Pan Am, operated
thirty-two commuter aircraft.81 Pan Am Express had followed the par-
ent airline into Chapter 11. Pan Am Express operated prior to 1988
without a certificate of convenience and necessity under an exception
to the Federal Aviation Administration's certification process. 82 Al-
75 See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
76 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000), amended by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272,
§ 5(c), 108 Star. 1373; Act of Oct. 22, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, tit. II, § 201(a), 108
Stat. 4119. See Appendix B of this Note for the post-1994 amendment version of
§ 1110.
77 See infra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
78 See infra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
79 See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
80 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (1988). In 1984, as a part of the deregulation of the air-
line industry, the CAB was dissolved. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703. Subsequently, the Secretary of Transportation be-
came authorized to issue these certificates. See Kathryn Hoff-Patrinos, Aviation Finance
Revisited: The 1994 Amendments to Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code, 69 Am. BANr, R. L.J.
167, 178 n.46 (1995).
81 In re Pan Am Corp., 124 B.R. 960, 964 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
82 Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 80, at 178.
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though Pan Am Express did eventually receive the certificate and held
it when it filed its bankruptcy petition,83 many of its aircraft were ac-
quired while it was operating under the FAA exception.
8 4
The bankruptcy court held that lease and sales agreements be-
tween Pan Am Express and its creditors entered into before the air-
line obtained the certificate were not protected by § 1110.5 While
conceding that the language of § 1110 did not require the airline to
have held the certificate at the time of acquisition, the court believed
"to rule otherwise would lead to incongruous results."8" The court
feared that creditors who had knowingly entered into agreements with
non-certified carriers would receive an undeserved benefit if the air-
line later obtained a certificate. 87 The creditors could have protected
themselves by conditioning the agreement on Pan Am obtaining the
certificate, but they did not.88 The court stated, "They assumed a cal-
culated risk and have lost."89
The 1994 amendments to § 1110 redefined covered air carriers.
The reference to "a certificate of convenience and necessity" was re-
moved. The amended § 1110 now applies if three criteria are met.
First, the debtor must be a citizen of the United States.9" Second, the
carrier must hold an operating certificate issued by the Secretary of
Transportation. 9 1 Finally, only aircraft capable of carrying ten or
more passengers or 6000 pounds or greater of cargo are eligible for
§ 1110 protection. 92 This amendment effectively extended § 1110
protection to financiers of all commuter airlines.931
B. Scope of Leases and Security Interests
During their reorganization proceedings, some airline debtors ar-
gued that § 1110 only applied to aircraft acquisition transactions.94
This was important because of the frequent use of sale-leaseback trans-
83 Pan Am, 124 B.R. at 964.
84 Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 80, at 178.
85 Pan Am, 124 B.R. at 968-69.
86 1I.
87 Id.
88 1(. Apparently this type of conditioned financing had been routinely em-
ployed in the aviation financing business. See Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 80, at 178.
89 Pan Ant, 124 B.R. at 968-69.
90 11 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (2) (A) (2000).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 80, at 178.
94 For a general discussion the issues confronting bankruptcy courts in their ap-
plication of § 1110, see generally Giddens & Schick, supra note 7 (providing a pre-
amendment view); and Marvin E. jacob & Michele J. Meises, The 1994 Amendments to
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actions in the airline industry95 Braniff, Pan Am, and Continental
Airlines all used sale-leaseback agreements to generate capital before
filing Chapter 11 petitions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 96 All
three airlines brought actions in the bankruptcy court seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the sale-leaseback agreements were not sub-
ject to § 1110. 9 7 The airlines argued that § 1110 only applied to
acquisition agreements whereby the airline took possession of new air-
craft.98 The airlines based their argument on what they perceived as
the underlying legislative purpose of § 1110, to strengthen the credit
power of airlines so they could engage in fleet modernization. 9 9 Fleet
modernization necessarily entails the acquisition of new aircraft. Fur-
thermore, § 1110 specifically protected holders "of a secured party
with a purchase-money equipment security."'10 0 The use of the word
"purchase," the airlines argued, implied that Congress only intended
§ 1110 to apply to acquisition transactions.
Although Continental experienced a fleeting success with this ar-
gument in the bankruptcy court, 10 1 courts generally rejected these ar-
guments. The Continental court agreed that one goal of § 1110 was to
facilitate the purchase of new aircraft, but stated that "we do not be-
lieve the legislative history clearly demonstrates that this was Congress'
sole aim."' 0 2 The bankruptcy court in Braniff again found no support
for the theory that new acquisitions were "a necessary prerequisite for,
the protections [of § 1110]."103 According to the Braniff court, Con-
gress had not designed § 1110 for the protection of the airlines, but
Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Issues Left Up in the Air, 5J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
349 (1996) (providing post-amendment opinion).
95 See supra note 6.
96 Braniff had filed a second Chapter 11 petition on September 28, 1989. See In
re Braniff, 110 B.R. 980 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990). Continental filed its second petition
in ten years on December 3, 1990. See In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 932 F.2d 282 (3d Cir.
1991). Pan Am filed its petition on January 8, 1991. See In rePan Am Corp., 125 B.R.
372 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
97 See Cont'lAirlines, 932 F.2d at 283-84; Pan Am, 125 B.R. at 372-73; Braniff 110
B.R. at 981.
98 See Cont'lAirlines, 932 F.2d at 285; Pan Am, 125 B.R. at 376; Braniff 110 B.R. at
981.
99 See Cont'lAirlines, 932 F.2d at 285; Pan Am, 125 B.R. at 376; Braniff 110 B.R. at
982.
100 11 U.S.C. § Il10(d)(2) (1994) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000)).
101 In re Cont'l Airlines, 123 B.R. 713 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991). The bankruptcy
court accepted Continental's argument but was reversed by the district court. See In re
Cont'l Airlines, 125 B.R. 399 (D. Del. 1991). The Third Circuit subsequently affirmed
the district court's decision. Cont'l Airlines, 932 F.2d at 282.
102 Cont'l Airlines, 932 F.2d at 291.
103 Braniff 110 B.R. at 983.
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rather to protect the rights and interests of the equipment
financiers.
10 4
Airlines also argued that § 1110 only applied to true leases, and
did not apply to disguised security interests. 10 5 The district court in
Pan Am adopted this theory.'0 6 Congress, the court reasoned, was
well aware of the distinction made in the Uniform Commercial Code
between true leases and disguised security agreements, and still used
language that protected only leases.' 0 7 According to the district court,
§ 1110 only protected true leases. 108 This statement, however, ap-
pears to be mere dicta, because, as the court concedes, the issue was
not properly before the court and had no impact on the resolution of
the matter. 10 9
Congress addressed both these issues in the 1994 amendments to
§ 1110.' 10 The phrase "purchase-money equipment security interest"
was abandoned. The revised § 1110 now protected "the right[s] of a
secured party with a security interest in equipment . ..or of a les-
sor." '11 1 Any lease or security interest in aircraft now falls under the
umbrella of § 1110. Characterization of an agreement as a true lease
or a disguised sale no longer matters, because both transactions are
covered by the revised statute. The question of whether aircraft were
acquired by the airline in the agreement giving rise to the security
interest is likewise irrelevant."l
2
C. Section 1129 "Cramdown" and § 1110
In the reorganization plan, a debtor may attempt to modify the
terms of pre-petition debt over the objection of a creditor." 3 This is
104 Id. at 984.
105 Jacob & Meises, supra note 94, at 357 (discussing the contention and its
implications).
106 See In re Pan Am Corp., 125 B.R. 372, 380 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
107 Id.
108 Id. The Third Circuit in Continental came to a similar conclusion. See In re
Cont'lAirlines, 932 F.2d 282, 285 (3d Cir. 1991) ("We hold that § 1110 covers only true
leases .... ).
109 Pan Am, 125 B.R. at 380.
110 Act of Oct. 22, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000)).
111 Id.
112 Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 80, at 171 ("The major effect of the 1994 Amend-
ments is to remove any controversy over whether a particular agreement.., is a lease,
a conditional sale or a sale subject to a security interest. Because all three types of
agreements are now covered by § 1110 .. .there should be little reason to raise the
issue.").
113 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
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known as the "cramdown" provision. In their second Chapter 11 reor-
ganization, Continental Airlines entered into § 1110 agreements with
several of its creditors in order to retain possession of its aircraft. Sub-
sequently, Continental submitted a reorganization plan that proposed
to modify the terms of the pre-petition agreements.' 1 4 The creditors
objected, arguing that the § 1110 agreements should be considered
post-petition agreements and, therefore, not subject to the cramdown
provisions of § 1129.115 The bankruptcy court never resolved the is-
sue because the creditors eventually accepted the proposed plan." 6
The 1994 amendments attempt to resolve this issue by providing
that the financier's right to take possession of the collateral is not
affected by § 1129.117 The legislative history of the amendments states
that the new language intended to make clear "that the rights of a
§ 1110 or § 1168 creditor would not be affected by § 1129
'cramdown'."' 118 Although at least one commentator found this lan-
guage ambiguous and predicted extensive litigation over its mean-
ing,"19 the intent of Congress to protect financiers seems apparent,
and this change has sparked little controversy in the courts.
III. WESTERN PACIFIC AiRLINES AND THE 2000 AMENDMENTS
TO § 1110
On October 6, 1997, Western Pacific Airlines (WestPac) filed a
voluntary Chapter 11 petition. 20 At the time of filing, WestPac oper-
ated eighteen leased Boeing 737s, under agreements with various les-
sors. On December 3, 1997, the fifty-eighth day after the filing of the
petition, the bankruptcy court approved WestPac's financing plan,
which allowed the airline to access $23 million in Debtor-in-Possession
(DIP) loans. 12 1 On December 4, 1997, the fifty-ninth day after the
filing, WestPac used most of the DIP loan proceeds to cure its post-
petition defaults on the aircraft leases, and continued to retain posses-
sion of the aircraft. 122 In late January, 1998, however, WestPac suf-
fered more financial setbacks, and was unable to meet several
114 See Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 80, at 180.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 179-80.
117 11 U.S.C. § 1110.
118 H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 44 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3353.
119 See Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 80, at 180.
120 See In re W. Pac. Airlines, Inc., 219 B.R. 298, 300 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
121 Id.
122 Id.
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scheduled lease payments in early February, 1998.123 Subsequently,
the lessors sought immediate repossession of the aircraft pursuant to
§ 1110.124
WestPac agreed to surrender six of the 737s, but sought to cure
their defaults and retain the remaining twelve aircraft. 25 WestPac ar-
gued that the language of § 1110 granted the airline a thirty-day pe-
riod to cure each default of the lease, even after the sixty-day grace
period had expired.12 6 The aircraft lessors, on the other hand, ar-
gued "that upon expiration of the initial 60-day period they have-at
the instant the Debtor airline failed to make a post-petition lease or
maintenance reserve payment-an unqualified, immediate and com-
plete right to retake possession and control."' 27
The bankruptcy court agreed with the lessors' interpretation of
§ 1110.12 The court recognized that the purpose of the section was
to protect "the financiers of extremely expensive, highly-maintenance
intensive, mobile equipment."1 29 The court recognized that § 1110
granted a thirty-day time limit to cure default, but this "only applies to
lease payments that come due during the first 60 days of the case."' 30
Lease payments due after the sixty-day grace period must be made in
accordance with the original pre-petition lease.1 ' To adopt the air-
line's approach and grant a thirty-day period to cure after each and
every default, the court concluded, would undermine the purpose of
§ 1110.132
The district court, however, reversed the bankruptcy court's deci-
sion. " I' In its opinion, the bankruptcy court misread the purpose of
the protections granted in § 1110. Section 1110 was designed to serve
a very limited function and protect a specific and narrow class of cred-
123 Id. at 30 1. For reasons not clear from the opinion, in the last week of January
WestPac's DIP creditors informed the airline that further financing would only be
available if the DIP lenders approved each expenditure on an "item-by-item, day-by-
day basis." d.
124 Id.
125 W Pac Airlines, 219 B.R. at 301 n.4; see also Kilborn, supra note 5, at 46-47.
126 W Pac. Airlines, 219 B.R. at 302.
127 Id. at 300.
128 Id. at 30 1.
129 Id. (relying on In re Air Vermont, Inc., 761 F.2d 130, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1985);
Seidle v. GATX Leasing Corp., 778 F.2d 659, 664 (11th Cir. 1985)).
130 Id. at 303.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 305.
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itors.1 3 4 According to the district court, § 1110 gave aircraft lessors
the power to take possession of aircraft if, and only if, the airline fails
to cure within the initial sixty-day grace period. 135 Once the airline
cured its defaults in this initial time-period and agreed to perform all
its future obligations under the pre-petition lease, § 1110 no longer
applies, and "the lessor's potential automatic right to a lifting of the
automatic stay terminates and it assumes the status of any other les-
sor/creditor. '"1 36 Furthermore, the district court relied on principles
of equity, citing the potential harm to DIP creditors if § 1110 allowed
the aircraft lessors to take possession of the airplanes.1 37
The district court in Western Pacific seems to have misread the
purpose of § 1110. Section 1110 clearly intended for an airline in
Chapter 11 to decide early in the proceedings either to surrender the
aircraft or accept the terms of the pre-petition agreement. There is a
strong implication, therefore, that the terms of the pre-petition agree-
ment will govern the relationship between creditor and airline for the
remainder of the Chapter 11 proceedings. In the district court's in-
terpretation of § 1110, an airline could cure its defaults, accept the
terms of the pre-petition lease fifty-nine days after filing the petition,
and then default two days later, and thereby avoid any § 1110 ramifi-
cations, and the lessor would simply be another secured creditor in
bankruptcy. It seems to make little, if any, sense for the Code to re-
quire the acceptance of the pre-petition agreement if the airline can
later breach the agreement without penalty.
Congress, as well it seems, thought that Judge Kane of the Colo-
rado District Court missed the point. In 2000, Congress amended
§ 1110 to clarify this issue, and adopted the interpretation first em-
ployed by the bankruptcy court. 38 Under the new, and current,
§ 1110, pre-petition defaults must be cured by the end of the initial
sixty-day period.13 9 Defaults that occur between the filing of the peti-
tion and the end of the sixty-day period must be cured by the later of
thirty days from the date of default or the expiration of the sixty-day
134 Id. at 310. Furthermore, the court relied on the sparse legislative history of
§ 1110 to conclude that the section must be narrowly construed. Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 308. The lessors' appeal to the Tenth Circuit was dismissed as moot,
because the creditors failed to obtain a stay of the district court's order. See In re W.
Pac. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 1999).
138 Act of Apr. 5, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-181, tit. VII, § 744(b), 114 Stat. 177. See
Appendix C of this Note for the current version of § 1110.
139 11 U.S.C. § 11l0(a)(B)(i).
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grace period. 140 Finally, defaults that occur after the expiration of the
sixty-day grace period must be cured in accordance with the pre-peti-
tion lease or security arrangement, if such agreements allow for
cure.14' If the current version of § 1110 had been in effect during
Western Pacific, the aircraft lessors would certainly have had the right
to take possession of WestPac's aircraft.
CONCLUSION
Section 1110 of the federal Bankruptcy Code forces debtor air-
lines to make decisions very early in their reorganization efforts re-
garding their most important asset-their aircraft. Congress believed
that the great expense of transportation equipment combined with
the relative financial instability of the transportation industry justified
greater protection for secured creditors and lessors of aircraft. Sec-
tion 1110 is only the latest chapter in a long history of protecting the
investments of transportation equipment financiers. Originally, this
protection was found in section 77 (g) of the old Bankruptcy Act and
is now codified in both § 1110 and § 1168 of the current Bankruptcy
Code. If the current wave of airline bankruptcies continues, whether
or not to enter into § 1110 agreements will be a time-consuming deci-
sion that must be made in the face of a relatively short deadline.1 42
140 Id. § 1110(a)(B)(ii).
141 Id. § 1110(a)(B)(iii). To default after sixty days means, of course, that the
debtor had agreed to adhere to the original terms of the agreement during the sixty-
day period.
142 The recent experiences of National Airlines and US Airways in Chapter 11
bear this out. In the first year of its reorganization, National Airlines and its aircraft
creditors filed dozens of stipulations, on an almost monthly basis, requesting the ex-
tension of § 1110's sixty-day period. See Docket Sheet, In re Nat'l Airlines, Inc., No.
00-19258 (Bankr. D. Nev. filed Feb. 2, 2001). Typically, these stipulations agreed that
the airline would continue to make the payments due under the original lease agree-
ment, and the creditor would not seek to exercise its § 1110 rights although National
had not cured its pre-petition arrearages. The creditor did not waive its § 1110 rights,
it merely granted the debtor an extended time to fulfill its responsibilities under
§ 1110. By entering into these stipulations over and over again, National was able to
continue to operate its aircraft without curing its pre-petition default for nearly a year
until the proposed plan of reorganization was submitted. For an example of this type
of stipulation, see Agreed Order Granting Stipulation by National Airlines, Inc. and
Ansett Worldwide Aviation USA Regarding Extension of the 1] U.S.C. 1110 Period, In
re Nat'l Airlines, Case No. 00-19258.
As of this writing, US Airways has yet to enter into any § 1110 agreements with
the lessors of its aircraft. The airline has filed a motion, however, seeking the bank-
ruptcy court's permission to enter into § 1110 agreements or stipulations extending
the timeframe of § 1110 with its creditors without prior court approval. See Motion
for Order Authorizing Entry Into 1110 Agreements and Stipulations Extending Time
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In the twenty-five year history of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress
has amended § 1110 twice, in 1994 and 2000. Both times have been
in response to court decisions attempting to interpret the section
without the aid of precedent or legislative history. That courts have
occasionally misinterpreted or misapplied Congress's intentions may
be an unavoidable result when a seldom-used provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Code is relied upon by parties.
Although some members of Congress expressed reservations as to
the necessity of §§ 1110 and 1168 when the new Bankruptcy Code was
introduced in 1977,143 transportation creditors clearly regard these
sections to be an almost unqualified success. The international avia-
tion community has taken note of the success of § 1110 in making
capital available to airlines. For instance, the proposed International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law Convention on Interna-
tional Interests in Mobile Equipment contains a provision inspired by
§ 1110.144 Industry analysts expect § 1110 and its international coun-
terparts to continue to play a major role in aircraft financing as the
increased demand for air travel requires airlines to engage in massive
fleet overhauls over the next several decades. 145
To Comply with Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code and To File Aircraft Agreement
Modifications Under Seal, In re US Airways Group, Inc., No. 02-83984 (Bankr. E.D.
Va., filed Sept. 6, 2002). In its motion, US Airways indicated that the sheer size of its
leased fleet made the decisions as to what leases to assume or reject very difficult. Id.
16. The airline was, according to its motion, engaged in extensive renegotiations of
its leases with the aircraft owners, and the success of those renegotiations would have
a serious impact on the airline's decision of what aircraft to fly. See id. The US Air-
ways motion provides a small glimpse into the extensive negotiations that § 1110 re-
quires happen early in an airline's Chapter 11 proceeding.
143 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
144 See Anthony Saunders et al., The Economic Implications of International Secured
Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 309, 327 (1999);
Jeffery Wool, The Case for a Commercial Orientation to the Proposed UNIDROIT Convention
as Applied to Aircraft Equipment, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 79, 92 (1999) (noting that
international credit rating agencies grant a rating enhancement of two notches to
secured debt protected by § 1110).
145 Saunders et al., supra note 144, at 328 (noting that industry analysts expect that
airlines outside of North America will require an estimated $1 trillion in aircraft
financing over the next twenty years).
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Original Version of 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1978)
(a) The right of a secured party with a purchase-money equipment
security interest in, or of a lessor or conditional vendor of,
whether as trustee or otherwise, aircraft, aircraft engines, propel-
lers, appliances, or spare parts, as defined in § 101 of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301), or vessels of the United
States, as defined in subsection B(4) of the Ship Mortgage Act,
1920 (46 U.S.C. 911(4)), that are subject to a purchase-money
equipment security interest granted by, leased to, or conditionally
sold to, a debtor that is an air carrier operating under a certificate
of convenience and necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, or a water carrier that holds a certificate of public conve-
nience and necessity or permit issued by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, as the case may be, to take possession of such equip-
ment in compliance with the provisions of a purchase-money
equipment security agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract,
as the case may be, is not affected by section 362 or 363 of this
title or by any power of the court to enjoin such taking of posses-
sion, unless-
(1) before 60 days after the date of the order for relief under this
chapter, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, agrees to
perform all obligations of the debtor that become due on or
after such date under such security agreement, lease, or con-
ditional sale contract, as the case may be; and
(2) any default, other than a default of a kind specified in section
365(b) (2) of this title, under such security agreement, lease,
or conditional sale contract, as the case may be-
(A) that occurred before such date is cured before the expi-
ration of such 60-day period; and
(B) that occurs after such date is cured before the later of-
(i) 30 days after the date of such default; and
(ii) the expiration of such 60-day period.
(b) The trustee and the secured party, lessor, or conditional vendor,
as the case may be, whose right to take possession is protected
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under subsection (a) of this section may agree, subject to the
court's approval, to extend the 60-day period specified in subsec-
tion (a)(1) of this section.
146
146 Bankruptcy Code, ch. 11, § 1110, 92 Stat. 2629 (1978) (current version at 11
U.S.C. § 1110 (2000)).
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APPENDIX B
Post-1994 Amendments Version of 1 U. S.C. § 1110
(a) (1) The right of a secured party with a security interest in equip-
ment described in paragraph (2) or of a lessor or conditional
vendor of such equipment to take possession of such equip-
ment in compliance with a security agreement, lease, or condi-
tional sale contract is not affected by section 362, 363, or 1129
or by any power of the court to enjoin the taking of possession
unless-
(A) before the date that is 60 days after the date of the order
for relief under this chapter, the trustee, subject to the
court's approval, agrees to perform all obligations of the
debtor that become due on or after the date of the order
under such security agreement, lease, or conditional sale
contract; and
(B) any default, other than a default of a kind specified in
section 365(b) (2), under such security agreement, lease,
or conditional sale contract-
(i) that occurs before the date of the order is cured
before the expiration of such 60-day period; and
(ii) that occurs after the date of the order is cured before
the later of-
(I) the date that is 30 days after the date of the de-
fault; or
(II) the expiration of such 60-day period.
(2) Equipment is described in this paragraph if it is-
(A) an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or spare
part (as defined in section 40102 of title 49) that is subject
to a security interest granted by, leased to, or condition-
ally sold to a debtor that is a citizen of the United States
(as defined in section 40102 of title 49) holding an air
carrier operating certificate issued by the Secretary of
Transportation pursuant to chapter 447 of title 49 for air-
craft capable of carrying 10 or more individuals or 6,000
pounds or more of cargo; or
(B) a documented vessel (as defined in section 30101(1) of
title 46) that is subject to a security interest granted by,
leased to, or conditionally sold to a debtor that is a water
carrier that holds a certificate of public convenience and
necessity or permit issued by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
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(3) Paragraph (1) applies to a secured party, lessor, or condi-
tional vendor acting in its own behalf or acting as trustee or
otherwise in behalf of another party.
(b) The trustee and the secured party, lessor, or conditional vendor
whose right to take possession is protected under subsection (a)
may agree, subject to the court's approval, to extend the 60-day
period specified in subsection (a) (1).
(c) With respect to equipment first placed in service on or prior to
the date of enactment of this subsection, for purposes of this sec-
tion-
(1) the term "lease" includes any written agreement with respect
to which the lessor and the debtor, as lessee, have expressed
in the agreement or in a substantially contemporaneous writ-
ing that the agreement is to be treated as a lease for Federal
income tax purposes; and
(2) the term "security interest" means a purchase-money equip-
ment security interest.
14 7
147 Bankruptcy Code, ch. 11, § 1110, 92 Stat. 2629 (1978) (as amended by Pub. L.
No. 103-294, tit. I, § 201(a), 108 Stat. 4119; and Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 5(c), 108 Stat.
1373).
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APPENDIX C
Current Version of 11 U.S.C. § 1110
(a) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and subject to subsection
(b), the right of a secured party with a security interest in
equipment described in paragraph (3), or of a lessor or condi-
tional vendor of such equipment, to take possession of such
equipment in compliance with a security agreement, lease, or
conditional sale contract, and to enforce any of its other rights
or remedies, under such security agreement, lease, or condi-
tional sale contract, to sell, lease, or otherwise retain or dis-
pose of such equipment, is not limited or otherwise affected by
any other provision of this title or by any power of the court.
(2) The right to take possession and to enforce the other rights
and remedies described in paragraph (1) shall be subject to
section 362 if-
(A) before the date that is 60 days after the date of the order
for relief under this chapter, the trustee, subject to the
approval of the court, agrees to perform all obligations of
the debtor under such security agreement, lease, or con-
ditional sale contract; and
(B) any default, other than a default of a kind specified in
section 365(b) (2), under such security agreement, lease,
or conditional sale contract-
(i) that occurs before the date of the order is cured
before the expiration of such 60-day period;
(ii) that occurs after the date of the order and before the
expiration of such 60-day period is cured before the
later of-
(I) the date that is 30 days after the date of the de-
fault; or
(II) the expiration of such 60-day period; and
(iii) that occurs on or after the expiration of such 60-day
period is cured in compliance with the terms of such
security agreement, lease, or conditional sale con-
tract, if a cure is permitted under that agreement,
lease, or contract.
(3) The equipment described in this paragraph-
(A) is-
(i) an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or
spare part (as defined in section 40102 of tide 49)
that is subject to a security interest granted by, leased
to, or conditionally sold to a debtor that, at the time
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such transaction is entered into, holds an air carrier
operating certificate issued pursuant to chapter 447
of title 49 for aircraft capable of carrying 10 or more
individuals or 6,000 pound or more of cargo; of
(ii) a documented vessel (as defined in section 30101(1)
of title 46) that is subject to a security interest
granted by, leased to, or conditionally sold to a
debtor that is a water carrier that, at the time such
transaction is entered into, holds a certificate of pub-
lic convenience and necessity or permit issued by the
Department of Transportation; and
(B) includes all records and documents relating to such
equipment that are required, under the terms of the se-
curity agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, to be
surrendered or returned by the debtor in connection with
the surrender or return of such equipment.
(4) Paragraph (1) applies to a secured party, lessor, or conditional
vendor acting in its own behalf or acting as trustee or other-
wise in behalf of another party.
(b) The trustee and the secured party, lessor, or conditional vendor
whose right to take possession is protected under subsection (a)
may agree, subject to the approval of the court, to extend the 60-
day period specified in subsection (a) (1).
(c) (1) In any case under this chapter, the trustee shall immediately
surrender and return to a secured party, lessor, or conditional
vendor, described in subsection (a) (1), equipment described
in subsection (a) (3), if at any time after the date of the order
for relief under this chapter such secured party, lessor, or con-
ditional vendor is entitled pursuant to subsection (a) (1) to
take possession of such equipment and makes a written de-
mand for such possession to the trustee.
(2) At such time as the trustee is required under paragraph (1) to
surrender and return equipment described in subsection
(a) (3), any lease of such equipment, and any security agree-
ment or conditional sale contract relating to such equipment,
if such security agreement or conditional sale contract is an
executory contract, shall be deemed rejected.
(d) With respect to equipment first placed in service on or before
October 22, 1994, for purposes of this section-
(1) the term "lease" includes any written agreement with respect
to which the lessor and the debtor, as lessee, have expressed in
the agreement or in a substantially contemporaneous writing
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that the agreement is to be treated as a lease for Federal in-
come tax purposes; and
(2) the term "security interest" means a purchase-money equip-
ment security interest.
148
148 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000).
